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I INTRODUCTION 
 
How might a development economist view the Malaysian economy? What are 
its key ‘stylized facts’ and its salient features? To what extent does its 
development record conform to the received wisdom on growth and 
development? These questions inform the analytical framework which guides 
this paper. 
 
Starting with the big picture, at least five, and perhaps several more, features 
stand out in any overview of its development record. The first, and by far the 
most important, is success. In its almost five decades of Independence, 
Malaysia’s growth record comfortably places it in the top performance decile 
of developing countries. It is among the tiny handful of countries to have 
performed consistently well since the 1970s. It was rightly included among the 
World Bank’s (1993) “miracle” economies. It may not have grown quite as fast 
as China and the four Asian NIEs, but very few countries elsewhere have 
been able to match its record. 
 
A second feature is the consistency of its performance. Inevitably, as one of 
the most open economies in the world, external events quickly impact on it. 
But its growth record has been impressive virtually throughout the period of 
Independence. When the economy has experienced difficulty, for example, in 
the 1997-98 Asian economic crisis and the mid 1980s recession, it has 
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invariably bounced back quickly, testifying to its fundamental strengths and 
resilience. 
 
A third feature is what one may term ‘economic policy orthodoxy’. Perhaps the 
most important contemporary challenge for development economics is to 
understand and explain long term differences in economic performance: why 
have some countries (like Malaysia) consistently grown more quickly than 
others; why are there ‘chronic economic dropouts’, and why do some appear 
to be particularly vulnerable to ‘boom and bust’ cycles? In the search for 
explanations, empirical verification of contending theories is providing 
important clues to these questions, while also of course highlighting much that 
is unknown. It will be argued in Section III that much of Malaysia’s economic 
success can be explained by the more or less continuous adherence to 
‘orthodoxy’ – principally openness and prudent macroeconomic management 
– by all five post-Independence administrations. Malaysia’s policy orthodoxy, 
predictability, and consistency are, I believe, absolutely central to any 
explanation of its success.  
 
A fourth feature is what may be regarded as Malaysia’s ‘inclusive 
development’ style. Inheriting a highly unequal distribution of income and 
wealth from the colonial era, successive governments have generally ensured 
that the benefits of rapid growth have been distributed reasonably broadly. Of 
course, there are conspicuous exceptions to this generalization. As in all 
countries, those close to the centres of power, and skilled in the art of rent-
seeking, have enriched themselves spectacularly. But by and large, practically 
every Malaysian has benefitted from growth in some measure. The NEP and 
its successors have of course been central to this achievement, but several 
other factors are also relevant. 
 
Finally, and consistent with the current predilection of economists to 
‘rediscover’ history, initial conditions have shaped Malaysia’s development 
trajectory in important ways. One, already alluded to, was the high levels of 
inequality generally associated with the colonial-era plantation-based, enclave 
economy; further complicated in Malaysia’s case by the fact that this 
inequality had an ethnic dimension. While this created great challenges for the 
newly independent economy, there were also significant positives at the time 
of Independence: relatively high per capita income, a well functioning 
bureaucracy and legal system, and reasonably good (though spatially 
maldistributed) physically infrastructure. 
 
This paper offers a broad assessment of Malaysian economic development 
over the past quarter century, set against the broader Southeast Asian 
experience. Section II examines the comparative record according to some 
key indicators. Section III looks at development achievements in more detail. 
Section IV considers some key development issues and challenges, while 
Section V summarizes our principal arguments. 
 
 
II COMPARATIVE OVERVIEW 
 
Any comparative assessment of Malaysia’s development record naturally 
invites the question, ‘compared to who or what’? Since Malaysia is a founding 
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member of ASEAN, the usual comparators are drawn from among its 
Southeast Asian neighbours, or East Asia more generally. But apart from 
geographical proximity and policy similarities, there is no obvious East Asian 
comparator. If Penang were a nation state, it would make sense to compare it 
to Singapore, but a broader Malaysia-Singapore comparison obviously 
encounters difficulties. Malaysia and Thailand share many common features, 
but their initial conditions, institutions and natural resource endowments are 
also rather different. Malaysia’s natural resource abundance invites a 
comparison with Indonesia, but the countries are very different in so many 
respects. 
 
In an earlier period, the then Malaya was frequently compared to the West 
African state of Ghana. The two had a common colonial master, were tropical, 
and were major cash crop (especially rubber) exporters. Professor Peter 
Bauer’s seminal contributions to our understanding of markets and 
development over 50 years ago were based on his work in the two countries. 
Ghana’s per capita income was somewhat higher than Malaysia’s at the time 
of Independence, but thereafter Malaysia’s record has been so superior that 
the comparison is now all but pointless, except as a contrasting case study in 
development economics, of what to do (Malaysia) and to avoid (Ghana).1
 
Another set of comparisons has involved Malaysia and Sri Lanka, countries 
with somewhat similar colonial histories, populations, ethnic divisions, and 
cash crop export specializations (see Bruton et al, 1992). Here, too, Sri Lanka 
had the edge over Malaysia at the time of Independence, with similar per 
capita incomes but superior human capital. There were of course historical 
differences between the two in initial conditions, with Malaysia possessing a 
richer natural resource endowment. But the main point of the comparison is 
that Malaysia has grown much faster than Sri Lanka for most of the period 
since the 1960s, owing to better policies (especially before Sri Lanka 
reformed) and the absence of conflict, to the point where the comparison is 
now hardly relevant. 
 
Thus, in the absence of anything better, the comparisons might as well be 
with its East Asian neighbours, recognizing the caveats noted above. Table 1 
provides a summary set of indicators for Malaysia and the major East Asian 
developing economies with a per capita income (in PPP terms) of at least 
$3,000. We briefly discuss here how Malaysia ranks according to growth, 
macroeconomic management, openness, human capital, and a range of other 
indicators. 
 
    (Table 1 about here) 
 
First, Malaysia is a relatively rich and small economy. Its economy is about 
the same size as Singapore’s, while its per capita income is about three times 
that of Indonesia and about double China. Since 1980, its per capita GDP has 
more than doubled, in line with all the major ASEAN economies except the 
Philippines, but significantly slower than China.  
 
                                                 
1 In fairness to Ghana, its recent performance has improved considerably, and 
it is now considered to be among Africa’s better governed economies. 
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Second, Malaysia’s macroeconomic management has been among the best 
in the developing world. Inflation has never been a problem, in most years 
falling below 5%, generally between the Singapore and Thailand averages. 
The country is moderately indebted, as indicated by its debt/GDP ratio. But 
debt service has never been a problem, owing to its highly outward 
orientation. Remarkably among developing countries, it has never 
experienced a serious debt or balance of payments crisis, apart from the 
special case of the 1997-98 Asian crisis. 
 
Third, its economy is exceptionally open, with one of the highest trade/GDP 
ratios in the world. It is one of the half dozen developing economies which 
Sachs and Warner (1995) classified as ‘always open’, according to a robust 
set of criteria. Even among the export-oriented economies of East Asia, it has 
always had by far the highest trade/GDP ratio, apart from the special case of 
the two city states. In recent years, this ratio has risen rapidly owing to the 
very large share of electronics in the country’s exports (the second highest 
share in East Asia, after Singapore), owing to the ‘slicing up’ of the production 
process in that industry, and the consequent thin domestic value added in its 
exports. But other indicators support the contention that it is a very open 
economy. Its average tariff rate is low, and there are few non-tariff barriers 
outside the automotive industry and some heavy industries. It does not score 
more highly on various indices of economic freedom principally because, 
rightly or wrongly, the various NEP-type commercial restrictions count against 
it. Malaysia is also very open to foreign direct investment (FDI), with a high 
FDI stock/GDP ratio, and with FDI generally dominating its aggregate capital 
inflows.2
 
Malaysia has never deviated from its open economic policy posture, which 
was rooted in the colonial era, and has never been fundamentally questioned 
since (Ariff, 1991). It may not have been ‘made by God for free trade’, in the 
manner that Indonesian geography is some times characterized. It is beyond 
the scope of this paper to examine why it has always been so open. But for 
what it is worth, my speculation is that it reflects a combination of at least four 
factors: 
• Entrenched and powerful export interests. 
• A recognition that, inevitably, protection would predominantly benefit non-
bumiputera business interests, and hence run counter to the spirit of the 
NEP. 
• Owing to sound macroeconomic management, there has never been a 
balance of payments crisis, which in some countries (eg, the Philippines, 
arguably) has been an accidental trigger for the adoption of ‘temporary’ 
protectionist measures which quickly become embedded in the country’s 
political economy. 
                                                 
2 See Menon (2000) for further discussion and empirical estimates of 
Malaysia’s openness. Another dimension is of course its labour market, with 
foreigner workers, legal and illegal, reportedly accounting for as much as 20% 
of the workforce (at least until the recent crackdown), one of the highest 
figures in the developing world. 
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• Its proximity to always-open Singapore which, whatever the political 
realities, has been highly influential in the conduct of Malaysian 
commercial policy. 
 
Fourth, Malaysia’s human capital indicators are generally good but not 
outstanding. Here, too, history has shaped these outcomes. The country’s 
public expenditure on education is one of the highest in East Asia, but it is still 
catching up from the colonial inheritance of under-investment. Thus, it is 
ahead of its lower-income ASEAN neighbours but behind the NIEs on years of 
schooling and gross tertiary enrolment ratios.3 Its R&D efforts also follow such 
a ranking, resulting in some observers characterizing its technology strategy 
as ‘passive, FDI reliant’ (eg, Lall, 2003), in contrast to the NIE economies 
which have made a more vigorous attempt to develop domestic supply-side 
capabilities. In fairness, though, Malaysia has recently increased its R&D 
effort substantially (the figure cited in Table 1 from comparative data is about 
half the current reported R&D/GDP percentage). Moreover, Malaysia hit the 
‘turning point’ of rapidly rising real wages, hence necessitating a greater 
technological effort, about a decade after the Asian NIEs. From that 
perspective, its R&D effort has not lagged as much. 
 
Finally, Malaysia scores at least moderately well on a range of indicators 
which are presumed to be conducive to rapid economic development. Its 
physical infrastructure is (and always has been) one of the best in East Asia. 
Its financial system is sophisticated,4 and its tax rates competitive. Its 
bureaucratic quality, country risk assessments, and its corruption rating all 
generally fall within the range of the NIEs. These measures are all crude, 
subjective and debatable. But they do mostly confirm generally perceptions of 
Malaysia, that it is a competently governed state, with a predictable 
commercial policy environment, and reasonably good institutions. 
 
 
III THE DEVELOPMENT RECORD 
 
Malaysia has grown very fast, in most years by at least 5% per annum, and 
generally a good deal more. The structure of its economy has also changed 
profoundly, from one dependent on agriculture and natural resources, to a 
broad-based economy with manufacturing and services of increasing 
importance. These two inter-related themes, combined with consistent global 
orientation and distributional considerations, dominate the development 
record since the 1970s. 
 
Figure 1 shows economic growth over the period 1965-2000. Growth has 
been in the range 5-8% per annum in most years, with significant dips 
occurring on average once per decade. There were only two major departures 
                                                 
3 The latter figure probably understates Malaysia’s ratio, owing to the fact that 
its large overseas student body is likely to be under-reported in the 
comparative statistics.  
4 Indeed, its financial sector may be a bit too ‘sophisticated’. The country has 
one of the highest stock market capitalization/GDP ratios in the world, a 
phenomenon which complicated the government’s post-1997 recovery 
strategies, owing to its highly leveraged corporate sector (Athukorala, 2001).  
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from this record of rapid growth. One was the mid 1980s, when Malaysia 
experienced a brief and mild recession, while the other was the more serious 
crisis of 1997-98. In both cases, a mixture of external and domestic factors 
caused the problem, and in both the response by the authorities was 
reasonably sure-footed and swift. In the mid 1980s, the sharp decline in 
commodity prices combined with expansionist fiscal policies (partly related to 
the heavy industry and NEP objectives) explained much of the downturn, 
which for varying reasons affected all of Southeast Asia. Yet by the end of the 
decade, the economy was growing strongly again. The causes of and 
responses to the 1997-98 events are more controversial, but the key point to 
note is that economic recovery was surprisingly strong and quick. It is 
important to emphasize that the global orientation, on both the current and 
capital account, was a factor in both the initial downturn and the swift 
recovery. 
 
    (Figure 1 about here) 
 
Over the long run, growth has been remarkably consistent, in the sense that, 
with the possible exception of the period of exceptionally strong growth 1988-
97, no one decade or episode stands out. That is, there has been rapid 
growth in all three decades since 1970. Thus, Malaysia has been more like 
the NIEs (and Thailand), as compared to some of its neighbours, especially 
Indonesia. Nor has there been a ‘turning point’ in its economic fortunes, 
coinciding with a major policy change, such as for example in China after 
1978, India after 1991, Indonesia after 1966 (and again 1998), and Vietnam 
after the mid 1980s Doi Moi. As a corollary, no one administration stands out 
in Malaysian economic development, in the sense that all four past prime 
ministers have generally presided over rapid growth. 
 
As would be expected in a rapidly growing, internationally oriented economy, 
structural change has been rapid. Over the period 1970-2000, the share of 
agriculture fell quickly, from 29% to 9% (Table 2). Most of the increase 
occurred in manufacturing, which more than doubled its share to 33%. 
Marking a turning point in the long sweep of economic development, 
manufacturing output surpassed that of agriculture in the late 1980s, and is 
now almost four times larger. The share of services rose significantly in the 
early 1970s and late 1990s, both periods coinciding with a pronounced 
increase in direct and indirect government expenditure in the economy. 
Employment shares have also changed significantly, albeit not as fast and 
with a lag (Table 3). From 1975-2000, agriculture’s share of employment fell 
by more than half, while that of manufacturing rose by about 50%. 
Manufacturing employment overtook agriculture in the mid 1990s. It is 
important to note that the differences in sectoral labour productivities in 
Malaysia are relatively small, under-scoring the undistorted nature of its 
economy. In particular, manufacturing productivity is only about 50% higher 
than the economy-wide average, quite low by developing country standards, 
and reflecting its predominantly labour-intensive character. 
 
    (Tables 2 & 3 about here) 
 
The transformation in the composition of merchandise exports over this period 
was even faster than that of output and employment, with the share of primary 
 (7) 
products falling from 78% to 12%, while manufactures rose from 9% to 86%. 
Within the latter, electronics are absolutely dominant, generating about 70% 
of manufacturing exports and over 60% of the total. Two observations on 
these trends should be noted. The first is the irony that, in a country which in 
an earlier period worried about high commodity dependence (principally 
rubber and tin), export concentration is now as high as it was in the early post-
Independence period. The nature of the dominant export is of course vastly 
different, of course, as electronics offers a very wide array of market niches, 
product specialization, and factor intensities. The fact remains, however, that 
Malaysia’s fortunes are still closely tied to those of one industry, the global 
electronics cycle. The second comment is that these shares do overstate the 
magnitude of the export transformation. This is because much of the 
electronics exports comprise thin local value added in which output is sliced 
up across many products and countries as part of MNE owned and dominated 
international production networks. 
 
Turning to the distribution story, as noted Malaysia inherited ‘Latin American’ 
(and Philippine) style inequality, with a plantation economy and commercial 
enclaves connected to the global economy, alongside a poor, predominantly 
Malay rural economy. The principal difference between Malaysia and these 
high inequality comparators is that it has grown much faster, and political 
power has been in the hands of the poorest ethnic group rather than the 
landed/commercial elite, thus ensuring a more concerted approach to 
addressing social grievances. 
 
Inequality has remained fairly high since Independence, with the gini ratios 
(based on household income) generally moving in the range 0.45-0.5.5 There 
seems to have been a dip in the 1970s and 1980s, followed by an increase in 
the 1990s, before  tapering off again in the wake of the Asian economic crisis. 
Trends in the series for urban and rural areas have broadly followed the 
aggregate picture, with the rural figure lower than the urban, but the difference 
continues to be surprisingly small. Among ethnic groups, Malay incomes have 
gained relative to both the Chinese and Indian communities, but the former 
still remain significantly lower than the latter two. Inequality within the Chinese 
and Indian communities has remained broadly stable, while it appears to have 
risen within the Malay community. There does not appear to be any evidence 
of increased immiserization by ethnicity, region, or socio-economic class, with 
the possible exception of some very poor and uneducated plantation workers 
(reportedly mainly among the Indian community), where large-scale in-
migration has also probably depressed earnings of the unskilled.6
 
With rapid growth, and little major change in inequality, poverty has fallen 
rapidly, from about 52% of households in 1970 to some 8% in 1999. The 
                                                 
5 This paragraph draws on Ragayah (2004) who, together with references 
cited therein, provides a comprehensive review of trends in inequality. 
6 More generally, perhaps these pockets of under-privilege, associated with 
low skills and individuals falling through the cracks of various NEP schemes, 
are more widespread than is commonly appreciated. See for example Ismail 
(2005), who highlights the continuing modest living standards of Malay 
smallholders. I am grateful to Colin Barlow, whose recent review drew this 
volume to my attention.  
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incidence (percentage) of poverty in rural areas is about three times that in 
urban areas, a relativity which has remained broadly constant since the 
1970s. Absolute poverty, in the sense of World Bank benchmarks of daily 
expenditures below $1 and $2 (PPP), has virtually disappeared. Indeed, the 
Malaysian poverty figures do not appear to be comparable either across 
countries or over time, since the national poverty line is relatively high and it is 
adjusted over time. 
 
Three broad sets of factors are relevant in assessing these poverty and 
inequality outcomes. The first is growth which, in the absence of any major 
swings in inequality, accounts for virtually all of  the decline in poverty, and 
has been slightly pro-poor (or more particularly ‘pro-Bumiputera) in its 
orientation. The second, related to the first, has been employment outcomes. 
Unemployment had all but disappeared by the late 1980s, by which time 
Malaysia (like Singapore a decade earlier) became a chronic labour-scarce 
economy. These employment outcomes were the joint result of the scale and 
type of growth – mostly rapid, and much of it labour-intensive, especially in 
export-oriented manufacturing. 
 
A third factor has been public policy interventions, which in various forms 
have been either pro-poor or at least distributionally neutral. Malaysia has 
consistently had the world’s best tropical agriculture research and extension 
efforts, with its rubber and palm oil institutes a model for other countries 
(Barlow, 2000). These institutes underpinned Malaysia’s status as the world’s 
most efficient producer of a range of tropical cash crops. They also 
contributed to the dramatic improvement in rural Malay incomes, and they are 
part of the reason why the country pulled ahead of the early comparators like 
Ghana. A second productive area of intervention has been education, with a 
particular focus on improving educational outcomes among the Bumiputera 
community through a system of generous scholarships. Some have argued, 
persuasively in my view, that this was probably the most effective component 
(in terms of both efficiency and equity) of the various NEP programs (Gomez 
and Jomo, 1997). A third inter-related factor has been some of the other NEP 
programs, an issue to which we return shortly. 
 
Why has Malaysia performed so well? Explaining the development record of 
countries is never easy, and often the tentative hypotheses beg as many 
questions as they answer. One has to combine history, institutions and 
policies; to try to understand not just what happened (ie, what policies were 
pursued) but why; to distinguish between ‘good luck’ and ‘good management’; 
and allow for the interplay between domestic and external factors. Modern 
growth theory and empirics are expanding rapidly (see Temple (1999) for an 
informative general survey), in the process assisting our understanding of 
country dynamics. I am not, however, aware of any detailed research applying 
this framework specifically to the Malaysian case.7
                                                 
7 Hill and Hill (forthcoming) recently applied the standard growth econometrics 
methodology to the five original ASEAN member countries. In the case of 
Malaysia, they found that a robustly constructed empirical growth equation, 
incorporating the explanatory variables usually considered to be important 
determinants of inter-country growth differences, significantly under-estimates 
the country’s growth rate over the period 1970-2000. One possible 
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One can at least begin to address this question by discarding a few likely 
dead ends. Two in particular come to mind. One is that Malaysia is blessed 
with natural resources, and that it simply had to ‘dig them out of the ground’ to 
grow. While it is true that the country is amply endowed, this view overlooks 
the ‘natural resource curse’, that for a variety of reasons, resource-rich 
countries tend to perform less well than resource poor ones (see Sachs and 
Warner (2001) for extensive discussion of this issue). In any case, Malaysia 
has continued to perform well as it has moved well beyond its earlier natural 
resourced based development phase.  
 
A second argument might posit good luck – a painless and relatively well-
prepared transition to Independence, favourable commodity prices for 
extended periods, reasonably generous aid flows in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and so on. These, too, may be correct, but there are plenty of counter-
factuals, of countries with similar experiences performing poorly. Moreover, it 
would surely be stretching the argument to assert that the succession of 
competent UMNO-based administrations since 1957 was somehow not 
endogenous, or that Malaysia enjoying an ‘early mover’ advantage in export-
oriented industrialization was in some senses accidental. 
 
The more persuasive arguments rest on the proposition that Malaysian 
governments have successfully implemented ‘orthodox’ economic policies, of 
the kind which have been demonstrated to be highly growth-conducive. These 
factors were alluded to above. At least four seem to stand out consistently. 
One is the country’s openness. Very few developing countries have been 
more open, and the link between openness and growth (provided the other 
ingredients are present) is firmly established. Second has been the 
consistently good macroeconomic management, and the absence of any 
macroeconomic and balance of payments crises, apart from the special case 
of 1997-98. Third, growth has been reasonably ‘inclusive’, in the sense that 
practically the entire population has benefitted to some degree. This has 
provided the social cohesion which has underpinned stability in a multi-ethnic 
community highly exposed to the international economy, including the 
inevitable shocks associated with openness. Fourth, institutions have been 
above average by developing country standards, and these have ensured 
reasonably effective policy implementation, and policy predictability. Of 
particular relevance is the judicial system. Whether or not it has been 
weakened or politicized, Malaysian property rights and commercial/legal 
protection are arguably one of the best, and most consistent, in the 
developing world.  
 
Initial conditions obviously mattered. As the late Benjamin Higgins once 
observed: 
'The relative success of Malaysia among Asian countries since Independence 
is to be explained partly by differences in the impact of colonialism before 
Independence. Colonial economic penetration came late in Malaya, with 
                                                                                                                                            
explanation is that, in the widely used international Penn world tables of 
national accounts (which were also used in this study), and for reasons which 
are not obvious, Malaysia’s recorded investment rate is significantly lower 
than that of its own local-currency national accounts data.  
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rubber, in the last decade of the nineteenth century. Consequently, the 
population explosion also came late, population pressure on the land never 
became severe, and development strategy could take the form of frontier 
resource development for three decades after Independence.' (Higgins, nd, 
chapter XV, p. 15) 
Indeed, and related to this argument, perhaps Malaysia fits the now 
increasingly popular ‘inherited institutions’ explanation for high growth. 
According to this view, congenial living conditions for expatriate settlers in the 
colonial era induced these communities to establish deep roots in the new 
environment, and hence to ‘transplant’ their home-country institutions. In turn, 
and unless the decolonization process was accompanied by violent struggle 
and rejection of the values associated with the metropolitan power, the newly 
independent state more or less incorporated these institutions into the 
formation of its own nation state (see Acemoglu et al, forthcoming). 
 
A number of other factors could obviously be added to this list. Historically, 
Malaysia was among the first group of developing countries to shift in to 
export-oriented manufacturing, and thus it was able to establish a ‘country 
reputation’ for export success and a congenial base for MNEs well ahead of 
most countries. Physical infrastructure and financial development are two 
additional variables. Another is that, although the country’s political structures 
have probably become more centralized over time, the country’s federal 
structure (the only one in East Asia) has enabled well governed states to be 
able to reform more quickly, and attract investment.8
 
With these pillars of efficiency and openness, the export sector was able to 
support (and contain) the political excesses and scandals which have 
inevitably occurred from time to time. That is, ‘UMNO money politics’, rent-
seeking, some costly industrial white elephants and mega projects become a 
lot easier to manage, and finance, when much of the economy is 
internationally oriented and efficient. Moreover, patronage and corruption has 
always been much more contained than in most of its neighbours. 
 
I leave it to political scientists to answer the ‘why’ questions, that is of why 
economic policy has never been seriously derailed. Partly it is a story of 
success bequeathing further success. As far as I’m aware, UMNO leadership 
always saw the policy challenge as ‘redistribution with growth’, and never just 
the former. Perhaps it was based on a pragmatic realization that radical 
redistribution would bring everybody down, and that the non-Bumiputera 
community always had migration options.  
 
Moreover, as I read the political science literature on Malaysia, it doesn’t 
seem to fit comfortably into any simple mould. That is, it has never been the 
insulated state that for example has been used to characterize Korea and 
Taiwan in an earlier period. Nor is it really Ammar Siamwalla’s (1999) ‘bi-
                                                 
8 The state of Penang, the fastest growing state outside the capital, is a case 
in point. Here, a succession of able state administrations, combined with high 
educational achievement, excellent, globally-connected infrastructure, and an 
early mover advantage in MNE, export-led industrialization, have underpinned 
a growth rate well above the national average. See Toh (2002) for an 
examination of Penang’s development. 
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furcated state’, his characterization of Thailand’s competent macroeconomic 
management alongside micro interventions which are much more vulnerable 
to capture. Nor is it a Singapore story of one absolutely dominant figure on the 
political landscape for the first quarter century of Independence. Politics has 
been competitive, albeit within well defined parameters of Malay dominance. 
Hence the characterizations of its political system being ‘repressive-
responsive’ (Crouch, 1996), and Malaysian businesses whose operations are 
found right across Peter Searle’s spectrum from ‘rent-seekers to real 
capitalists’ (Searle, 1999). 
 
 
IV DEVELOPMENT ISSUES AND CHALLENGES 
 
There are many interesting and distinctive aspects of Malaysia’s development 
record. To give a flavour of some of the development challenges and policy 
debates, we briefly look at three which have had significant international 
resonance: the heavy industry experiment, the affirmative action/NEP 
programs, and the capital controls imposed in September 1998. Each is a 
major and complex topic, and we cannot pretend to offer anything other than 
some broad-brush impressions. 
  
Industry policy
 
Malaysian industry policy constitutes a clear departure from its otherwise 
generally orthodox economic strategy. In the late 1970s the government 
embarked on a number of ambitious heavy industry programs, the most 
important of which was an attempt to build a ‘Malaysian car’. Steel, 
petrochemicals and other heavy industries were also targeted for promotion. 
This was very much a creature of the times. State-led industrialization 
strategies were then in vogue. Japan, and the alleged MITI industrial planning 
model, were in the ascendancy, and Dr Mahathir had announced a ‘look East’ 
strategy. Malaysia was flush with windfall oil revenues, and the government 
felt it could be adventurous. 
 
Almost from the beginning, these projects experienced difficulties.9 
Commodity prices began to fall from the early 1980s and, as the government 
began to run very large fiscal deficits, the envisaged funding base evaporated. 
The Japanese joint venture partners apparently did not provide the scale of 
technological assistance which was originally expected. But, perhaps more 
fundamentally, the analytical foundations of the ventures were shaky. This 
was a case of ‘back-to-front’ industrialization, attempting to build strengths on 
the basis of limited technological capabilities. That is, rather than developing 
supply-side technical and R&D expertise, together with a strong SME supplier 
base, industrial planners started at the other end. An additional complicating 
factor was that NEP objectives were also wrapped up into the projects, further 
burdening an already highly ambitious agenda. A quarter of a century later, 
none of the projects has reported achieved international levels of efficiency, 
and there has been a low rate of return on these huge investments, which in 
the automotive industry alone are estimated to total about $2 billion. The 
                                                 
9 See the contributors to Jomo and Felker (eds, 1999) and Jomo, Felker and 
Rasiah (eds, 1999) for detailed discussion of these projects. 
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technology alliance with Mitsubishi was terminated in early 2004. Foreign 
sales have been disappointing, and thus the firm has been restricted to the 
small local market. Even here, owing to Proton’s indifferent quality control 
standards, local consumers have been willing to pay up to double the price for 
similar sized imported vehicles. The heavy industry program has also 
complicated Malaysia’s trade policy negotiations, especially in the ASEAN 
Free Trade Agreement, where it is supposed to phase out its 300% import 
duties for autos by 2008. Meanwhile Thailand, which liberalized its protection 
more quickly than Malaysia, (and also Indonesia and the Philippines) has now 
become the dominant auto producing nation in Southeast Asia.10
 
Viewing these projects in broader context, a number of observations are 
warranted. First, undoubtedly there has been some technological learning 
from these projects, and domestic skills have been augmented. These 
objectives could of course have been achieved more efficiently through direct 
training and R&D support schemes. In particular, it is not clear how much 
these schemes have assisted the country in preparing for the current 
challenge of shifting gears into a more R&D intensive industrial trajectory. 
 
Second, there remains a political economy puzzle as to why a country which 
was so successful with its approach to agricultural extension (arguably the 
best in the tropical world) did not employ the same broad approach to 
industry. Perhaps the answer has to do with what was intellectually 
fashionable at the time, as well as preferences of particular administrations. 
 
Third, as in all policy discussions in Malaysia, it is important to keep in mind 
the overall environment. One of the benefits of Malaysia’s highly open 
economy is that mistakes are quickly detected, and there is political pressure 
from the efficient, export-oriented sector to take remedial action. Moreover, 
there is greater accountability and administrative capacity in the system. Thus 
really serious policy mistakes are less likely to occur, and the government is 
able to (and did) pull back. It is notable, for example, that two of Malaysia’s 
neighbours, Indonesia and the Philippines, also embarked on heavy industry 
initiatives at about the same time. In both cases, these ended up achieving 
less and probably cost more. 
  
A final consequence is that, perhaps more than most countries, Malaysia 
continues to exhibit a ‘dual industrial policy regime’, with a protected heavy 
industry sector (in fact the only part of the economy to receive significant 
protection) alongside a highly efficient, export-oriented electronics sector. 
Moreover, the latter grew out of, and is still overwhelmingly concentrated in, 
the country’s export zones. The development of efficient backward linkages is 
proceeding, perhaps more slowly than might be the case owing to regulatory 
barriers between the zones and the rest of the economy, and the need to 
upgrade the SME suppliers. The consequence is a somewhat unusual 
industrial structure, with a very large electronics sector, which dominates the 
                                                 
10 Further complicating reform of the highly protected auto industry is the 
Approved Importer System, under which the government awards licences for 
the approximately 50,000 annual vehicle imports. These have traditionally 
been an instrument of political patronage, which became an issue of public 
debate in 2005 when the identities of the beneficiaries was revealed. 
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country’s exports but which is still somewhat enclave in nature, alongside a 
protected heavy industry sector. This stereotype is perhaps somewhat 
exaggerated, but it does underline the importance of reform. That is, of forging 
an integrated and efficient industrial sector, which is less regulated but more 
promoted (in the sense of skills and R&D).11
 
 
Affirmative action programs  
 
Malaysia’s NEP12 programs, introduced in the wake of the deeply disturbing 
events of May 1969, have constituted the most durable, and arguably the 
most successful, set of affirmative action programs in the developing world. It 
is difficult to think of any other initiative of its kind which has ‘worked’ in the 
sense that a deliberately redistributive program has been implemented while 
achieving high growth and maintaining ethnic harmony. It is a model to which 
other countries aspire, most notably post-Apartheid South Africa. 
 
The details of the various NEP programs, and their implementation, are well 
known, and need not be repeated here (see Gomez and Jomo (1997) for a 
detailed study). Under the general goal of removing the association between 
economic differentiation and ethnicity, while maintaining high growth, a wide 
range of initiatives was introduced, including education programs, Bumiputera 
employment quotas in both the public and private sectors, and a redistribution 
of corporate ownership structures. 
 
In broad terms, the NEP would have to be regarded as a success. Rapid 
growth was maintained, thanks in part to a pragmatic implementation strategy, 
under which goals were flexibly pursued depending on economic 
circumstances. The socio-economic circumstances of the Bumiputera 
community has been improved significantly, both absolutely and relative to the 
other ethnic groups. There has been no significant backlash from the other 
groups, communal relations have by and large been harmonious, and political 
stability maintained.13
 
Notwithstanding this success, inevitably there are also some question marks. 
First, on the corporate restructuring, most of the increase in the Bumiputera 
share (from around 2% to 20% since 1970) occurred at the expense of foreign 
ownership, rather than non-Bumiputera shares. In fact, the latter has also 
increased since 1970. Thus, the very high initial foreign share actually had the 
                                                 
11 Several prominent Malaysian economists have written about these 
challenges recently. See for example Rasiah (2003), Ragayah and Tham 
(2006) and Tham (2004). 
12 We use ‘NEP’ as a short-hand for these affirmative action programs, even 
though the NEP was terminated in 1990 and replaced with the New 
Development Policy. 
13 A number of Malaysian commentators note with satisfaction that the 
country did not experience the traumatic ethnic disputes which occurred in 
Indonesia in 1997-98, and they are inclined to attribute this success to the 
NEP programs. The counter-factual is of course unknowable, although there 
certainly are grounds for this assertion. 
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benefit of providing the government with some room to move in its 
redistribution objectives. 
 
Second, one might debate which of the instruments have been more effective. 
The general impression is that those which are productivity-enhancing – such 
as education scholarships and agricultural extension – have contributed more 
directly to broad-based improvements in Bumiputera living standards, as 
compared to the redistributionist measures. The latter, inevitably, have tended 
to benefit the politically well-connected, especially as UMNO has ruled 
throughout the period. This factor probably also accounts for the observed 
increase in intra-Bumiputera inequality. More generally, were it not for the 
political constraints, one would argue that a first-best strategy would be to 
focus on the poor, regardless of ethnicity, so that an NEP-type program would 
also be aimed at, for example, the poor among the Indian and indigenous 
East Malaysian (Sarawak and Sabah) communities. 
 
A third observation is that there have been some losses of highly skilled 
people from among the non-Bumiputera communities. I am not aware of any 
quantification, and the outflows were probably larger in the first decade or two 
of the NEP when uncertainty surrounding its implementation was greater. But 
one does continue to note a significant number of very successful non-
Bumiputera Malaysians who have chosen to work and reside abroad. At the 
margin, also, the NEP programs may have deterred foreign investors 
somewhat, to the extent that their freedom to hire workers (especially 
managers) in an already very tight labour market has been complicated. 
Nevertheless, Malaysia’s FDI policies have been implemented in a pragmatic 
fashion, and it is arguably the case that these concerns (and the country’s 
surprisingly low ranking in the ‘commercial freedom’ indices reported in Table 
1) are exaggerated. 
 
A fourth challenge concerns an exit, or at least phasing-out, strategy. The 
political economy calculus in all public policy interventions is that it is much 
easier for governments to introduce special programs of assistance than to 
withdraw them. Inevitably, vested interests build up, and some individuals 
benefit spectacularly. Ideally, affirmative action programs should be regarded 
as temporary, perhaps stretching over a couple of generations in order to 
redress past ills and grievances. Will a Bumiputera-dominated government be 
able at some point to withdraw the privileges that its dominant support base 
has grown accustomed to? One senses already the complications which such 
a challenge poses. Conversely, Malaysia’s strong economic performance and 
pragmatic leadership provide grounds for optimism. 
 
Finally, whenever international lessons are being drawn from its experience, it 
is important not to lose sight of Malaysia’s fundamental strengths and 
distinctive characteristics, both of which make replication difficult. Its 
leadership has always been committed to growth. Decades of policy 
consistency and predictability have conferred ‘policy credibility’ on successive 
governments, giving them room to move. Its economy is highly open, thus 
quickly exposing any inefficiencies. Its macroeconomic management has 
always been excellent, and its institutions reasonably effective. Few if any 
regimes – including, arguably, post-Apartheid South Africa – can match this 
record in all these respects. 
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Capital controls  
 
Malaysia’s delayed response to the Asian financial crisis is also worthy of 
comment.14 Malaysia was one of the four economies severely affected by the 
crisis, with its economy contracting by almost 8% in 1998. It was the only one 
of the four not to formally enter an IMF program, though its policy response 
was broadly ‘IMF-like’ for the first year of the crisis. By mid-1998, unhappy 
with the sluggish economic recovery, a policy rethink apparently commenced. 
This culminated in the decision in early September 1998 to reject the IMF 
orthodoxy, peg the exchange rate, and impose controls on short-term capital 
flows. These measures coincided with the dramatic dismissal and 
incarceration of the then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister. 
 
Although regarded as a radical and bold experiment, and implemented 
against a backdrop of occasionally fierce anti-Western rhetoric, the measures 
were not especially unconventional, and it is clear in retrospect that they were 
carefully thought out and executed. The rationale was that, particularly in 
times of crisis, financial markets tend to over-shoot, and that there is a case 
for Keynesian-style reflationary measures to stimulate the economy. But such 
a strategy of loose monetary policy entails lower interest rates, which in turn is 
likely to lead to further capital outflow, and hence pressure on the exchange 
rate and financial system.15 Thus, so the argument goes, the domestic capital 
market needs to be temporarily disconnected from the global economy while 
the government pursues its stimulatory measures. 
 
This, broadly, is what the Malaysian government did for the 12-18 months 
after September 1998. Interest rates were lowered, and fiscal policy was more 
expansionist than arguably would have been the case without the controls. In 
retrospect, the policy experiment worked not only because there was a sound 
case for these measures in certain circumstances, but also because they 
were applied sensibly. Among the important elements of the stimulation 
package, the following were important: 
• The exchange rate chosen (R3.8 = $1) was on the ‘low’ side, thus 
conferring a major competitive boost to the tradables sector. 
• It was very clear that the target of the controls was purely short-term flows. 
The government went out of its way to reassure foreign equity investors; in 
fact FDI flows actually increased in the wake of the controls. 
• The reflation process was carefully managed, and the government was at 
pains to generally eschew playing political favourites with its bail-outs and 
expenditure projects. Moreover, the two key macroeconomic policy 
                                                 
14 This section draws heavily on what for me have been the two most 
insightful analyses of this episode, an insider’s account by a prominent 
Malaysian academic (Mahani, 2002) and the analytically coherent 
assessment by Athukorala (2001). 
15 A particular complication in the Malaysian case was that the ratios of stock 
market capitalization and outstanding credit to GDP were the highest among 
the four crisis economies, and thus its policy makers arguably had limited 
maneuverability in adjusting interest rates as a means of protecting the 
exchange rate.  
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institutions, Bank Negara Malaysia and the Ministry of Finance, both had 
long-established policy credibility. 
 
Three other points are worth observing. The first was the special problem 
Malaysia had pre-crisis in the large offshore RM circulation, principally in 
Singapore. The Malaysian authorities could reasonably argue that these 
transactions were of such magnitude that they had lost control of monetary 
aggregates – or at least were in danger of doing so. Thus the controls had a 
twin purpose, to reflate effectively, and to regain control of monetary policy. 
 
Second, in evaluating the program, the counter-factuals are inherently 
unknowable and untestable. One could of course argue that Korea and 
Thailand, which adhered to IMF programs, recovered just as quickly. The 
former two did of course lose some policy autonomy (a particular concern in 
Malaysia was that its NEP programs would come under pressure from 
‘Washington’). How significant this IMF intervention would have been by late 
1998 is not clear, as the Fund itself shifted ground significantly during that 
year, owing to its alleged mis-handling of Indonesia (and four years later 
Argentina) and much global criticism. Malaysia probably also denied itself 
some external funding windows, which for a period looked as though it might 
have been a problem, but eventually was not, owing to large current account 
surpluses and alternative funding channels. Although comparisons are difficult 
given the significant country differences, it has to be recognized that 
Malaysia’s economic and exchange rate recoveries were not substantially 
superior to those of Korea and Thailand over the period 1998-2002. Perhaps 
the strongest conclusion is that the controls worked much better than their 
detractors predicted, but it seems difficult to support their proponents’ view 
that they were the key to Malaysia’s impressive recovery. 
 
Third, as with everything Malaysian, its special circumstances need to be 
emphasized. That is, its policy credibility, absence of prior crises, relatively 
good institutions. It is not clear that its experience is at all generalizable. 
Indeed, none of its lower income neighbours embarked on such a course. For 
example, a Philippine Cabinet member remarked at the time that they 
considered the Malaysian option, for about 10 seconds! That country was not 
long out of a debilitating era of capital controls, which had witnessed 
extensive corruption and attempts to hold the rate at inappropriate levels. 
After the onset of the crisis, the peso float cushioned the country from more 
serious macroeconomic adjustment, and facilitated recovery. In the case of 
Indonesia, the option was not available owing to its participation in the IMF 
program. But, in any case, given its unhappy history with controls prior to 
1970, and the fact that the business community learned to live with the 
floating regime surprisingly quickly, it is unlikely that it was ever to be a 
serious option. 
 
As a footnote, one lesson from the Malaysian experience is that controls 
should be imposed ex ante rather than ex post. That is, they should be part of 
the pre-crisis policy environment, rather than imposed suddenly, during a 
crisis. The risk of an imposition in the manner of the Malaysian controls is that 
business will fear a re-occurrence, and therefore re-rate the country risk. 
(That this appears not to have happened reflects positively on Malaysia’s 
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long-established policy credibility.) It is arguably also the case that most of the 
capital flight had already occurred by September 1998. 
 
 
V SUMMING UP 
 
Malaysian economic development has been a remarkable success story, and 
one that few developing countries can match, certainly outside East Asia. At 
the time of Independence, it was a classic colonial, resource-rich, ‘enclave 
economy’, with a pronounced divide between the urban and rural economies, 
and among ethnic groups, and high levels of inequality. It also inherited 
several features, subsequently maintained and developed, which are central 
to understanding its development success story. These include its openness 
to the global economy, prudent macroeconomic management, its excellent 
physical infrastructure, and its above average institutional quality. It is broadly 
a case of ‘orthodoxy confirmed’, but with several distinctive features, 
particularly its handling of major ethnic differences. 
 
Looking ahead, the key question is whether the past bases of success can 
sustain the future momentum. The answer would seem to be partly yes and 
partly no. Its openness, prudent macroeconomic management and good 
infrastructure and institutions will always be important. The principal challenge 
is to manage the upgrading process to OECD levels of income and 
productivity. The huge inflows of unskilled workers since around 1990 have to 
some extent delayed this upgrading process, but the transition is both 
inevitable and desirable. The implication, as the current Malaysia Plan 
recognizes, is that the past bases of growth will have to be modified.  
 
Malaysia’s current per capita income is similar to that of the Asian NIEs about 
15 years ago. It was at about this period that all four economies invested 
substantially, though in different ways, in upgrading their physical, social and 
institutional infrastructure, with a view to attaining OECD levels within a 
generation. As Table 1 indicates, Malaysia lags somewhat in key areas of 
science and technology. Its universities, once among the best in East Asia, 
have not kept pace with the economy, and in some respect have reportedly 
slipped in quality, particularly in the sciences. R&D expenditure is rising, but 
arguably not quickly enough.  
 
Evidently, the country’s leadership does not yet appear to be convinced of the 
importance of committing strongly to a comprehensive technology strategy 
which develops and combines strengths based on the large MNE presence, 
its open labour market, its universities and public investments in R&D. The 
country continues to lose significant amounts of high-level, mainly non-
Bumiputera, skilled labour. By all available indicators, much of the large state 
enterprise sector performs indifferently. For example, over the period 1999-
2004, Government Linked Companies on the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange 
(which constitute over one-third of the KLSE’s market capitalization) delivered 
annual shareholder returns of just 3.6%, less than half that of privately owned 
firms (Economist, August 20, 2005). Many of these firms enjoy privileged, 
often monopoly, rights in their businesses. But they are also over-staffed, 
serve as vehicles of patronage, as well as being obliged to perform 
uneconomic community services and to offer preferential treatment to 
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Bumiputera supplier firms. Huge public sector projects are generally not open 
to competitive tendering, and they are well known as a means of enrichment 
for the politically well connected. The media remains heavily government-
influenced and lacks the capacity to act as an independent watchdog.  
 
Inevitably, for these reforms to be successful the country’s ‘sacred cows’ 
cannot avoid scrutiny. This will not be easy for a governing party which has 
been in power continuously since 1957, and for the Bumiputera community 
which has grown accustomed to preferential treatment. Indeed, in August 
2005 former Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim called for the abolition of 
the NEP, arguing that it is ‘… obsolete, corrupt, and that only a few well-
connected Malays have benefitted from it.’ There can be no doubting the 
importance of development strategies to tackle deep-seated poverty and 
inequality, especially when there is also an ethnic dimension. Yet, desirably, 
all affirmative action programs should be subject to a sunset clause, at which 
point the original objectives and instruments are re-evaluated. The NEP is no 
exception. As Mr Anwar and others have argued, the targeted welfare 
objectives should be maintained, albeit without an explicit ethnic component, 
while the overtly rent-seeking programs (eg, preferential access to 
government contracts, employment, licences, and share offerings) could be 
replaced with a new emphasis on technological modernization. Moreover, 
Malaysia’s rapidly changing demographics, the result of Chinese outmigration 
and significantly higher Malay fertility, is in any case going to render the NEP 
largely irrelevant, as the Bumiputera proportion of the population approaches 
75%, up from just over 50% at the time of the Program’s inauguration.  
 
These reforms will be politically and institutionally complex, and require a 
fundamental change in the mindset of the country’s political and bureaucratic 
elite. But in the absence of major reform, the country is in danger of entering 
an era of slower growth, unable to graduate from its current status as a 
(reasonably prosperous) middle-income developing country. As epitomized by 
the adjustments currently occurring in the large electronics industry in 
Penang, Malaysian firms now struggle to compete with China and others in 
labour-intensive activities employing mature, standardized technology, while 
at the same time they lack the technological capacity to match the more 
advanced NIEs. Taking the longer term view, the maintenance of rapid growth 
has always been a fundamental element of the ‘Malaysian compact’, and its 
policy makers are mindful of the importance of keeping up with its high-growth 
neighbours. Therefore, in the absence of any better predictor, the historical 
record suggests grounds for optimism in facing these challenges. 
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 PRC Indonesia Korea Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Tai
General economic 
indicators 
       
GDP, 2003 ($ billion) 1,410 208 605 103 79 91 143 
GDP per capita PPP, 2003 ($) 4,995 3,364 17,90
8 
9,696 4,321 24,480 7,580 2
GDP per capita growth, 1990-2003 (%) 8.2 3.1 5.1 3.9 1.0 3.5 4.2 
Annual average inflation, 1990-2003(%) 5.6 12.8 5.0 3.0 8.0 1.6 4.0 
Total external debt/GDP, 2002 (%) 13 76 23 51 76 266 47 
GDP per capita 2003/1980 6.1 2.2 3.7 2.2 1.1 2.5 2.9 
        
Openness        
 
Trade 
       
(Exports + imports)/GDP, 1990 (%) 29.9 54.5 58.4 154.8 62.9 373.8 79.7 
(Exports + imports)/GDP, 2003 (%)i 65.7 64.0 74.3 213.9 113.9 352.0 128.7 
Export growth, 1990-2003 (%)ii 18.0 8.1 9.3 11.3 10.7 9.1 10.3 
Average tariff rate, 2001iii 14.3 5.4 9.2 5.8 4.0 0.0 9.7 
Index of economic freedom, 2004iv 3.6 3.8 2.7 3.2 3.1 1.6 2.9 
 
Investment 
       
FDI as % of total capital inflows, 1990-2003v 93.0 -48.2 16.6 129.0 52.2 33.4 -19.2 
Total FDI inward stock, $ billion, 2003vi 501.5 57.2 47.5 59.0 11.5 147.3 36.9 
Total FDI outward stock, $ billion, 2003vii 37.0 2.7 34.5 29.7 1.0 90.9 3.3 
Total FDI inward stock as % of GDP, 2003 35.6 27.5 7.8 57.2 14.5 161.3 25.8 
Total FDI outward stock as % of GDP, 2003 2.6 1.3 5.7 28.8 1.2 99.5 2.3 
        
Human capital and 
innovation 
       
Years of education, 2000viii 5.7 4.7 10.5 7.9 7.6 8.1 6.1 
Gross tertiary enrolment rate (%), 2001 12.6 14.6 77.6 28.2 31.2 46.0 35.3 
R&D expenditure as % of GDP, 2002ix 0.6 - 2.6 0.2 - 1.4 0.1 
Number of internet users as % of total 
inhabitants, 2003 
6.3 3.8 61.3 34.5 4.4 54.8 9.7 
Public spending on education as % of GDP, 
2001x
2.1 1.3 3.6 7.9 3.2 3.1 5.0 
International ranking in quality of math & 
science educationxi
55 57 41 27 84 1 53 
Total R&D employment, thousand, 2001xii 956.5 - 165.7 10.1 - 19.5 14.0 
R&D employment per 1 million population, 
2001xiii
752 - 3,500 432 - 4,709 236 
Utility patents data, 2003xiv 0.2 0.0 82.7 2.0 0.3 99.3 0.4 
% of manufactured exports which are 'high 
tech', 2002xv
23.3 16.4 31.5 58.3 65.3 60.3 31.4 
        
Physical infrastructurexvi 60 45 23 22 87 6 39 
        
 (22) 
Institutional quality and 
risk 
       
 
Corruption 
       
Corruption perceptions index, 2003xvii
(country ranking) 
3.4 
(66) 
1.9 
(122) 
4.3 
(50) 
5.2 
(37) 
2.5 
(92) 
9.4 
(5) 
3.3 
(70) 
 
Country risk 
       
Composite risk ranking, 2002 75.0 58.3 79.8 77.5 71.0 90.0 76.3 
 
Property rights 
       
Index of economic freedomxviii 4 4 2 3 4 1 3 
 
Bureaucratic quality 
       
Public institutions index, 2004xix
(country ranking) 
4.39 
(55) 
4.12 
(68) 
4.81 
(41) 
5.06 
(38) 
3.21 
(99) 
6.21 
(10) 
4.71 
(45) 
        
Fiscal/finance        
Stock market capitalization as % of GDP, 
2003xx
48.3 26.2 54.5 163.2 29.3 115.4 84.4 
Highest corporate tax rate, 2003 (%) 33 30 27 28 32 22 30 
 
Note: All data covering a period of time, e.g., GDP per capita growth, 1990-2003, 
refer to the yearly average among all years during the period. 
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Table 2: Sectoral Growth Performance, Malaysia (1970-2002) 
(a) Composition (%)* 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1997 2002 
Agriculture 28.5 26.9 22.9 20.8 18.7 12.6 8.7 
Industry 32.3 32.6 35.8 36.7 42.2 41.3 44.6 
Manufacturing  15.8 17.3 19.6 19.5 26.9 34.2 29.9 
Services** 33.5 40.5 41.3 42.6 39.1 38.9 46.8 
GDP 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
        
(b) Average annual growth (%)* 1970- 75 
1975- 
80 
1980- 
85 
1985- 
90 
1990- 
97 
1997- 
02 
Agriculture  9.5 5.1 3.1 4.6 2.4 1.1 
Industry  6.7 10.7 5.7 9.8 12.8 3.3 
Manufacturing   6.7 11.4 5.3 13.7 13.2 4.1 
Services**  12.2 13.9 5.8 5.1 10.2 3.8 
GDP  10.6 8.5 5.2 6.8 8.1 3.2 
        
(c) Contribution to output 
increment (%) 
1970- 
75 
1975- 
80 
1980- 
85 
1985- 
90 
1990- 
97 
1997- 
02 
Agriculture  10.1 21.1 31.2 13.4 -2 4.4 
Industry  35.8 37.2 32.2 46.2 48.5 40.1 
Manufacturing   33.1 20.6 20 35.7 38.4 30.4 
Services**  114.1 41.7 36.2 30.2 48.5 55.5 
GDP  100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
Notes: * Output shares and growth rates are based on constant (1978) prices. Growth 
rates are annual averages between the reported years. 
 ** Include import duties net of bank service charges. 
Source:  Athukorala (2003), from Ministry of Finance Malaysia, Economic 
Report (various issues) 
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Table 3: Employment by Sector (% shares), Malaysia (1975-2003) 
 
Sectoral composition (%) 1975 1980 1985 1990 1997 2003 
Agriculture 43.6 40.6 31.3 29.9 16.6 13.8 
Industry 20.9 22.7 23.6 24.6 37.3 36.3 
Manufacturing 14.2 15.8 15.2 17.6 26.9 28.1 
Services 35.5 36.7 45.1 45.5 46.0 50.0 
Total  100 100 100 100 100 100 
Total  4376 4817 5622 6682 8817 10181 
       
Contribution to employment growth (%) 1976-80 1980-85 
1985-
90 
1990-
97 
1997-
03 
Agriculture  10.8 -24.3 22.5 -24.8 -4.8 
Industry  40.6 29.0 29.9 77.2 29.3 
Manufacturing  31.7 11.6 30.3 56.2 35.4 
Services  48.6 95.4 47.6 47.6 75.5 
Total   100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Athukorala (2003), from Ministry of Finance, Economic 
Report (various issues) 
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Figure 1:  Malaysia: Growth (1971-00)* and Unemployment (1980-00), (%) 
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Notes: 
* Growth rates are computed based on GDP at market prices from 1975 onwards. 
Prior to that, GDP at factor costs were used.   
 
Period-average growth rates: 
1971-1984 7.5 
1986-1997 8.3 
1971-2000 6.7 
 
Source:  Based on data compiled from Ministry of Finance, Economic Report, Kuala 
Lumpur (various issues) 
 
 
                                                 
i Data for Singapore are for the year 2002. 
ii Data for Singapore are for the period 1990-2002. 
iii Data for Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand are for 2000, 2002, 1997, and 2000 respectively. 
iv Index of economic freedom ranges from 0 (mostly free) to 5 (highly restricted). 
v FDI： Foreign Direct Investment. 
  Total capital inflows = Direct investment + (Net Increases in) portfolio investment liabilities + (Net 
Increases in) other investment liabilities. 
  FDI as % of total capital inflows = FDI inflows / total capital inflows. 
vi FDI inward stock:
  Data for Korea are accumulated since 1962. 
  PRC, Korea, Philippines, and Thailand: Stock data after 2002 are estimated by adding flows. 
  Indonesia: Stock data after 1999 are estimated by adding flows. 
  Malaysia: Stock data after 1994 are estimated by adding flows. 
  Taiwan: Stock data after 1988 are estimated by adding flows. 
vii FDI outward stock: 
  Data for Korea are accumulated since 1968. 
  PRC: Stock data after 1989 are estimated by adding flows. 
  Indonesia: Stock data after 1999 are estimated by adding flows. 
  Korea, Malaysia: Stock data after 2002 are estimated by adding flows. 
  Taiwan: Stock data after 1988 are estimated by adding flows. 
viii Years of education are average years of school over age 25. 
 (26) 
                                                                                                                                            
ix Data for Malaysia are for the year 2001. Data for Indonesia and Philippines are unavailable. 
x Data for the PRC, Singapore, and Taiwan are for 1999, 1995, and 2003 respectively. 
xi Based on the 1-104 country ranking in the Global Competitiveness Report (1=best). 
xii Data for Malaysia and Thailand are for 2000 and 1997, respectively. Data for Indonesia and 
Philippines are unavailable. 
xiii Data for Malaysia and Thailand are for 2000 and 1997, respectively. Data for Indonesia and 
Philippines are unavailable. 
xiv US utility patents granted per million of population. 
xv Data for Thailand and Taiwan are both for the year 2001. 
xvi Based on the 1-104 country ranking in the Global Competitiveness Report (1=best). 
xvii The index ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (highly clean). The world average for the 133 
countries covered is 4.2, with a maximum of 9.7 and a minimum of 1.3. 
xviii The property rights index is a composite from the index of economic freedom developed by the 
Heritage Foundation. The range is from 0 (very good) to 5 (very poor). 
xix The public institutions index is based on survey data and ranges from 2.47 to 6.59 across 104 
countries. The Higher the index, the higher the quality. 
xx Data for Singapore are for the year 2002. 
 
Sources:  
General economic indicators 
GDP, 2003 ($ billion) The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
GDP per capita PPP, 2003 ($) The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
GDP per capita growth, 1990-2003 (%) World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
Annual average inflation, 1990-2003(%) World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
Total external debt/GDP, 2002 (%) Total External Deb: 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
Inter-Agency Task Force on Finance Statistics,「 Joint BIS-IMF-OECD-World
Statistics on External Debt」 , http://www.oecd.org/dac/debt/ 
GDP per capita 2003/1980 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
 
Openness 
 
Trade 
(Exports + imports)/GDP, 1990 (%) 
(Exports + imports)/GDP, 2003 (%) 
Export growth, 1990-2003 (%) 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
National Statistics, Roc. http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ 
Average tariff rate, 2001 Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/ 
Index of economic freedom, 2004 Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/ 
 
Investment 
FDI as % of total capital inflows, 1990-2003 
Total FDI stock, $ billion, 2003 
Total FDI stock as % of GDP, 2003 
FDI: 
UNCTAD, World Investment Report, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ 
 
Total capital inflows: 
IMF, International Financial Statistics. http://www.imfstatistics.org/ 
Central Bank of China, ROC (Taiwan). http://www.cbc.gov.tw/ 
 
Human capital and innovation 
Years of education, 2000 Barro-Lee Education Data, http://www.nber.org/pub/barro.lee/ 
Gross tertiary enrolment rate (%), 2001 The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
R&D expenditure as % of GDP, 2002 World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
National Statistics, ROC (Taiwan). http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ 
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Number of internet users as % of total 
inhabitants, 2003 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
Public spending on education as % of GDP, 
2001 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. http://www.uis.unesco.org 
“Indicators of Educational Statistics of the Republic of China,” by the Minis
Education, ROC 
International ranking in quality of math & 
science education 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
Total R&D employment, thousand, 2001 
R&D employment per 1 million population, 
2001 
UNESCO Institute for Statistics. http://www.uis.unesco.org 
National Statistics, Roc. http://www.dgbas.gov.tw/ 
Utility patents data, 2003 The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
% of manufactured exports which are 'high 
tech', 2002 
World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
“Monthly Statistics of Exports and Imports Taiwan Area, ROC” by the Minis
Finance, ROC 
 
Physical infrastructure The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
 
Institutional quality and risk 
 
Corruption 
Corruption perceptions index, 2003xx
(country ranking) 
Transparency International, http://www.transparency.org/ 
 
Country risk 
Composite risk ranking, 2002 UNCTAD, World Investment Report, http://stats.unctad.org/fdi/ 
 
Property rights 
Index of economic freedomxx Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/ 
 
Bureaucratic quality 
Public institutions index, 2004xx
(country ranking) 
The Global Competitiveness Report 2004-2005. 
 
Fiscal/finance 
Stock market capitalization as % of GDP, 
2003xx
World Bank, World Development Indicators (Online). 
Taiwan Stock Exchange Corporation. 
Highest corporate tax rate, 2003 (%) Heritage Foundation, http://www.heritage.org/research/features/index/ 
 
